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entity, a new doctrine denying loss carryovers in continuing companies
where debt is cancelled would create still further inconsistency.
The problem is that the factors discussed seldom arise separately.
Change of stock ownership should not be relevant under the 1954 Code
except as specified in section 382. Cancellation of indebtedness should
not bar a carryover unless Congress so provides. If the two occur to-
gether, however, as will normally be the case after a Chapter X reorgani-
zation, the government will undoubtedly argue that two bad arguments
make a good one, and that the opportunity to cite both factors avoids the
necessity of analyzing either.
VI
ACQUISITIONS TO OBTAIN BENEFIT OF LOSSES - SECTION 269
Henry C. Harvey
Few taxpayers engage in business enterprises with the expectation of
incurring losses and presumably none with that intention. To those un-
fortunates who do find themselves in losing ventures the net operating
loss carryback and carryover provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
offer some consolation, indeed, at current high tax rates, considerably
more than mere glum consolation.
These provisions, however, afford relief only if the losses can be
brought into conjunction with profits within the prescribed time limita-
tions for carrybacks and carryovers. Occasionally, the necessary profits
cannot be generated internally, and the unfortunate taxpayer must search
elsewhere for earning assets or another profitable enterprise in order to
take advantage of the partial insurance against losses afforded by the tax
law.
In addition to these poor souls, predatory taxpayers also exist who are
ready and willing, for an appropriate price, to purchase a dying venture
and utilize its actual or potential loss deductions.
Both must reckon with a tangled web of technical and procedural
statutory rules relating to the transfer and preservation of losses,' with
the elusive concepts of the court decisions in this area,2 and finally with
1. See Pomeroy, Limitations Where Same Taxpayer Seeks to Carry Loss to Another Year, at
233, supra, and Adelson, Carrying Losses to a Different Taxpayer, at 262, supra.
2. Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382 (1957).
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a portion of the law - section 269 - specifically directed at tax moti-
vated acquisitions.3
BACKGROUND AND SCOPE OF SECTION 269
Section 269 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 had its origin
almost twenty years ago in the Revenue Act of 1943 which introduced
section 129 into the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. The language of
the two sections is for all practical purposes identical,4 except for the ad-
dition to section 269 of a presumption which is more fully discussed
later.
Section 129 was originally enacted (and continued in the 1954 Code
3. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 269, [hereinafter cited as CODE 5).
SEC. 269. ACQUISITIONS MADE TO EVADE OR AVOID INCOME TAX.
(a) IN GEmNPAL - IF -
(1) any person or persons acquire, or acquired on or after October 8, 1940, directly
or indirectly, control of a corporation, or
(2) any corporation acquires, or acquired on or after October 8, 1940, directly or
indirectly, property of another corporation, not controlled, directly or indirectly, immediately
before such acquisition, by such acquiring corporation or its stockholders, the basis of which
property, in the hands of the acquiring corporation, is determined by reference to the basis
in the hands of the transferor corporation,
and the principal purpose for which such acquisition was made is evasion or avoidance of Fed-
eral income tax by securing the benefit of a deduction, credit, or other allowance which such
person or corporation would not otherwise enjoy, then such deduction, credit, or other allow-
ance shall not be allowed. For purposes of paragraphs (1) and (2), control means the own-
ership of stock possessing at least 50 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes
of stock entitled to vote or at least 50 percent of the total value of shares of all classes of
stock of the corporation.
(b) PowER oF SECRETARY OR HIS DELEGATE TO ALLOW DEDUCTION, ETc., IN PART.-
In any case to which subsection (a) applies the Secretary or his delegate is au-
thorized -
(1) to allow as a deduction, credit, or allowance any part of any amount disallowed
by such subsection, if he determines that such allowance will not result in the evasion or
avoidance of Federal income tax for which the acquisition was made; or
(2) to distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, and distribute, apportion, or
allocate the deductions, credits, or allowances the benefit of which was sought to be secured,
between or among the corporations, or properties, or parts thereof, involved, and to allow
such deductions, credits, or allowances so distributed, apportioned, or allocated, but to give
effect to such allowance only to such extent as he determines will not result in the evasion
or avoidance of Federal income tax for which the acquisition was made or
(3) to exercise his powers in part under paragraph (1) and in part under para-
graph (2).
(c) PRESUMPTION IN CASE OF DISPROPORTIONATE PURCHASE PRIcE. - The fact that
the consideration paid upon an acquisition by any person or corporation described in
subsection (a) is substantially disproportionate to the aggregate -
(1) of the adjusted basis of the property of the corporation (to the extent attribut-
able to the interest acquired specified in paragraph (1) of subsection (a)), or of the
property acquired specified in paragraph (2) of subsection (a); and
(2) of the tax benefits (to the extent not reflected in the adjusted basis of the
property) not available to such person or corporation otherwise than as a result of such
acquisition,
shall be prima fade evidence of the principal purpose of evasion or avoidance of Federal in-
come tax. This subsection shall apply only with respect to acquisitions after March 1, 1954.
4. Because the two sections are substantially identical, the discussion herein generally refers
to § 269, although a number of the cases referred to were actually concerned with § 129.
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as section 269) for the purpose, among others, of preventing the traffick-
ing in "loss" corporations, and this has indeed been one of the most popular
areas for its application. It was a statutory enactment of the general
principle developed in earlier decisions that a deduction, credit, or other
allowance should not be available if its effect was to distort the liability
of a taxpayer when the essential nature of a transaction or situation was
examined in light of the basic purpose or plan which Congress sought to
effectuate by the deduction, credit, or allowance.'
Section 269 becomes applicable to the use of net operating losses or
net operating loss deductions6 when two conditions are present: (1) the
acquisition either of control of a corporation or of corporate assets under
specified circumstances, and (2) a tax avoidance motivation for the
acquisition. The first condition is purely objective and examination of
the facts relating to any acquisition or proposed acquisition will quickly
determine whether this is met. The second, relating to motivation or
purpose is, on the other hand, subjective and presents more difficult prob-




The first type of transaction at which section 269 is directed is the
acquisition of control of a corporation by any person or persons. Control,
which can be acquired directly or indirectly, is specifically defined as own-
ership of stock possessing at least fifty per cent of the total combined
voting power of all classes of stock or at least fifty per cent of the total
value of shares of all classes of stock.
This type of acquisition, commonly called a "control acquisition,"
presents relatively few problems. It either is present or is not as a matter
of fact. There is, however, uncertainty as to the meaning of the word
"indirectly" and to date no court has been called upon to interpret it.
Without specific reference in section 269 to any attribution of ownership
rules, which abound elsewhere in the Code, it is doubtful that an indirect
acquisition of control should be found to exist by reason of attributing
ownership of stock. On the other hand, it seems reasonably clear that
obtaining direct ownership of forty-nine per cent of the stock of a corpo-
5. Treas. Reg. 5 1.296-2(b) (1962) [hereinafter cited as Reg. ]. The decisions develop-
ing this principle include such landmark cases as Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940);
Griffiths v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 355 (1939); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
6. Section 269 actually applies to any type of deduction, credit, or other allowance under
the tax law, the term "allowance" having been defined as "anything in the internal revenue
laws which has the effect of diminishing tax liability." Reg. § 1.269-1(a) (1962). This
article, however, is confined to its effect on deductions for losses.
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ration with an option to acquire the balance should be regarded as the
acquisition of indirect control.
7
The organization of a new corporation is a control acquisition to
which section 269 applies.' This is so whether the new corporation has
one or many shareholders since the acquisition can be made by any person
or persons. Furthermore, a control acquisition can be made in a taxable
or a non-taxable transaction. It can also occur without the addition of
any stock to the existing holdings of a shareholder as, for example, the
redemption of some outstanding shares leaving the remaining share-
holder or shareholders in control.
Finally, a control acquisition need not be made in one step. When
ten per cent of the stock of a corporation is added to a long-standing hold-
ing of forty per cent, control is acquired at that time.' Thus, even a rela-
tively small stock purchase may meet the objective test of a control ac-
quisition, making it necessary to consider section 269 in order to protect
the tax future of the corporation or its shareholders.
Property Acquisition
The second type of transaction meeting the objective test of section
269 is an acquisition: by one corporation of property of another corpora-
tion - a so-called "property acquisition." In a property acquisition, which
can also be made directly or indirectly, it is necessary that (1) the corpor-
ate transferor of the property was not controlled, directly or indirectly,
prior to the acquisition by the acquiring corporation or its stockholders,
and (2) the basis of the acquired property in the hands of the acquiring
corporation must be determined in whole or in part by reference to the
transferor's basis.
A property acquisition, of course, most commonly exists as the result
of a tax-free reorganization. Section 269 does not apply to a taxable
purchase by a corporation of assets for cash even though the declared
purpose may be to bring earning assets into a losing venture to utilize
loss carryovers. Nor do all tax-free acquisitions of property fall within its
scope. While the transfer of property by an individual to a corporation
in exchange for all of its stock (tax-free under section 351 with no change
in basis of the property) may be a control acquisition, it is not a property
7. In analyzing a fact situation involving losses or loss carryovers, care must always be taken
to be certain that an indirect acquisition of control is not present. It seems likely that, through
a combination of this concept with the fact that control may be acquired by several persons,
the Commissioner may seek to extend the application of § 269 into areas hitherto considered
invulnerable.
8. James Realty Co. v. United States, 280 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1960).
9. Reg. § 1.269-1 (c) (1962). The section, on the other hand, would not apply if owner-
ship of 50% or more were acquired without any tax motive, and subsequently the remaining
stock was purchased in order to benefit from losses.
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acquisition falling under section 269. Furthermore, all corporate reor-
ganizations do not involve section 269 property acquisitions, as two cor-
porations under common control can be combined by the transfer of
property of one to the other in a merger or sale of assets for stock without
fear of section 269.1' Certainly to one seeking to utilize losses by an
acquisition, the property acquisition route presents more possibilities of
avoiding section 269 than the control acquisition route and should be
thoroughly explored if the utilization of losses is the primary motivation.
SUBJECTIVE PRINCIPLE PURPOSE CONDITION
Once it is determined that a control acquisition or a property acquisi-
tion meeting the objective test has occurred or is contemplated, section
269 will bar the use of losses if the principal purpose of the acquisition
is the evasion or avoidance of tax by securing the benefit of losses or loss
deductions which the acquiring person or corporation would not other-
wise enjoy. This necessitates an inquiry into the mind of the acquirer.
While subjective tests are no strangers to the tax law, they always pose
difficult problems."
Before discussing the factual question of whether the proscribed pur-
pose exists, it is well to have in mind a few basic interpretations of the
"principal purpose" clause. First, the purpose to be ascertained is the
purpose at the time of acquisition, not at some subsequent date when the
benefit of the losses is actually availed of or reflected in a tax return.'"
Second, if the purpose to evade or avoid tax exceeds in importance any
other purpose, it is the principal purpose.'"
A third basic interpretation was in considerable doubt for more than
fifteen years after the enactment in 1943 of section 129 (the predecessor
10. In a parent-subsidiary situation with losses in either company, the transfer of earning
assets either by parent to subsidiary in exchange for additional stock or as a capital contribution
or by subsidiary to parent in a complete liquidation should not be a § 269 property acquisi-
tion. The parent and subsidiary should be regarded as controlled directly and indirectly, re-
spectively, by the shareholders of the parent. In Coastal Oil Storage Co. v. Commissioner,
242 F.2d 396 (4th Cit. 1957), however, § 269 was said to be applicable to a transfer of
property from parent to subsidiary although this was not essential to the decision. Also,
the Regulations may be taken to indicate that a transfer of property from a parent to a losing
subsidiary is a qualifying property acquisition. Reg. § 1.269-3 c) (2) (1962).
11. See, e.g., CODE § 341 (relating to collapsible corporations); CODE § 531 (relating to
accumulations of surplus).
12. Hawaiian Trust Co., v. United States, 291 F.2d 761 (9th Cit. 1961).
13. Reg. § 1.269-3 (a) (2) (1962). The application of this rule to an acquisition involving
several business or non-tax purposes is not clear. Assume an acquisition motivated in part by
the desire to use loss carryovers and in part by three valid business purposes and assume that
the tax purpose can be determined to represent 40% of the "overall" motivation and each of
the others, 20%. Does the tax purpose "exceed in importance any other purpose"? Or will
the three others be considered collectively as the business purpose and thus outweigh the tax
purpose? No court to date has grappled with this question.
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of section 269). During those years, a controversy raged over applica-
tion of the section to the acquisition of control of a corporation which al-
ready had operating losses and which after the acquisition was merely
put into a position to use these losses itself. The early decisions under
section 129,14 and even until 1960 all the decisions of the Tax Court,
held that section 269 did not apply under these circumstances since the
acquired corporation was not securing the benefit of any deduction, credit,
or other allowance which it would not otherwise enjoy. The indirect
benefit to the person acquiring control was not considered to be one to
which the statute applied.
This narrow interpretation restricted the application of section 269 in
control acquisitions principally to cases in which the taxpayer had no
competent tax advice as most acquisitions could be arranged to fall out-
side its scope. It was first repudiated by several of the United States
courts of appeals in reversing Tax Court decisions,"5 was finally repu-
diated by the Tax Court itself,"0 and currently has no support whatever.
It is now clear that section 269 bars the use of losses or loss carryovers
in any type of acquisition meeting its conditions in which the proscribed
purpose is present, irrespective of whether the benefit of the loss is ob-
tained by the acquired corporation or indirectly by the shareholders in a
control acquisition.
Ascertaining the principal purpose of any acquisition is, of course, es-
sentially a factual question. In this area, the early decisions under section
129 also favored the taxpayer in that the courts were quite generally
satisfied that the principal purpose was not the avoidance of tax if the
taxpayer could advance any plausible business purpose for the acquisi-
tion. 7 Only about seven years ago did the courts begin to apply the
section in the manner which seems to have been intended by Congress
from the outset. Commencing with the American Pipe & Steel Corp.
decision,"8 the courts began to weigh the relative importance of the
business purpose or purposes against the tax benefits obtained or to be ob-
tained as a result of the acquisition. It is safe to say now that the unsup-
ported testimony of an interested taxpayer as to his business purposes for
acquisition of a loss corporation will not prevail if on analysis it is in-
14. T.V. D. Co., 27 T.C. 879 (1957); Alproa Watch Corp., 11 T.C. 240 (1948).
15. Commissioner v. British Motor Car Distribs., 278 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1960); Mill Ridge
Coal Co. v. Patterson, 264 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 816 (1959);
Coastal Oil Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1957).
16. Thomas B. Snyder Sons Co., 34 T.C. 400 (1960), aff'd, 288 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 823 (1961).
17. See, e.g., Wage, Inc., 19 T.C. 249 (1952); Chelsea Products, Inc., 16 T.C. 840 (1951),
a! Id, 197 F.2d 620 (3rd Cr. 1952); and Alprosa Watch Corp., 11 T.C. 240 (1948).
18. 25 T.C. 351 (1955), aff'd, 243 F.2d 125 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 906 (1957).
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herently improbable or lacks credulity, or if the alleged business purposes
are substantially outweighed by the tax benefits actually obtained. 9
The fact that the tax benefits flowing from net operating losses are
considered in the planning of an acquisition is not necessarily fatal'
However, a careful analysis and computation of the available operating
losses and carryovers prior to an acquisition, coupled with a failure to in-
vestigate with the same thoroughness the alleged business advantages, re-
cently weighed heavily against the taxpayer in Urban Redevelopment
Corp. v. Commissioner." It is almost certain that the Commissioner
will prevail if the acquisition involved is of control of a corporation with
past operating losses which is no more than a corporate shell at the time
of acquisition.
The tax practitioner considering a proposed acquisition, either of con-
trol or of property, which falls within section 269 and which will bring
losses into conjunction with profits must arm himself with contempor-
aneous evidence of the business or other non-tax purposes for the acquisi-
tion. If the principal purpose is, in fact, expansion of an existing busi-
ness into new products or new geographical areas, there should be market
research studies, profit forecasts, and similar analyses made prior to the
acquisition to demonstrate the real purpose. Otherwise the happening
of unforeseen events subsequent to the acquisition may, with the benefit
of hindsight, make the purpose of obtaining losses loom larger in rela-
tion to the business purposes. Alleged business advantages or purposes
of the acquisition will not suffice to outweigh the realized benefits of sub-
stantial loss carryovers if the facts taking place after the acquisition fail
to support them. =
19. See, e.g., Brown Dynalube Co. v. Commissioner, 297 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1962); J. G.
Dudley Co. v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 750 (4th Cir. 1962); Urban Redevelopment Corp. v.
Commissioner, 294 F.2d 328 (4th Cir. 1961); Huddle, Inc., 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 816
(1961).
20. Hawaiian Trust Co. v. United States, 291 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1961); Berland's, Inc., 16
T.C. 182 (1951).
21. 294 F.2d 328 (4th Cir. 1961).
22. See J. G. Dudley Co. v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 750 (4th Cir. 1962); Temple Square
Mfg. Co., 36 T.C. 88 (1961); Frank Spingolo Warehouse Co., 37 T.C. 1 (1961); John S.
Taft, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1239 (1961). It also seems dear that a token continuation of
the business of an acquired loss company will be regarded in the same light as the purchase of
a corporate shell. F. C. Publication Liquidating Corp. v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 779 (2d
Cir. 1962); Army Times Sales Co., 35 T.C. 688 (1961); Continental Machine & Tool Corp.,
P-H 1962 TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. (31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.) 5 62,096 (May 4, 1962).
23. Brown Dynalube Co. v. Commissioner, 297 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1962); F. C. Publication
Liquidating Corp. v. Commissioner, supra note 22. If the business purpose is to acquire and
put new life into a losing venture, the taxpayer must be prepared to defend himself by show-
ing reasonable prospects of reviving the business of the acquired corporation and real efforts
to that end after the acquisition. In R. P. Collins & Co. v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 602
(D. Mass. 1961), afld, 303 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1962), he failed in this respect and lost. This
case also indicates that purchase at a price which would produce a profit if the acquired com-
pany were liquidated - seemingly a showing that it was a good business deal irrespective of
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PRESUMPTION OF SUBSECTION (C)
In the area of principal purpose, it was intended in 1954 that the
Commissioner's arsenal of weapons be increased by the addition of sub-
section (c) to section 269. This provides in substance that, when the
consideration paid in an acquisition described in section 269 is substanti-
ally disproportionate to the sum of (1) the adjusted basis of the property
of the corporation in a control acquisition ' or of the property acquired
in a property acquisition, and (2) the tax benefits not available to the
acquirer otherwise than as a result of the acquisition, this shall be prima
fade evidence of the proscribed purpose. The legislative history dearly
indicates that "substantially disproportionate to" means "substantially less
than" and this is made dear in the Regulations 5
The peculiar workings of this presumption and the many problems
which may arise in the interpretation of subsection (c) have been the sub-
ject of considerable discussion. "  For example, if a taxpayer pays a high
price in a control acquisition, so that the consideration approaches the
adjusted basis of the corporate properties, plus the tax benefits to be ob-
tained from loss carryovers, the presumption will not operate. On, the
other hand, a taxpayer who is totally uninterested in, and unwilling to pay
for, loss carryovers, and who pays a price measured merely by the book
value of the corporation acquired, will be presumed to be seeking the loss
carryovers. It is a curious result that the presumption should thus operate
against a taxpayer who has no purpose whatever of acquiring the benefits
of losses.
Other facets of the presumption present a variety of puzzling ques-
tions. For example, why is the consideration measured against the ad-
justed basis of properties rather than their market value when market
value normally sets the price paid in an acquisition? When market value
exceeds basis the price paid may well equal the basis, plus tax benefits,
and yet tax benefits may be acquired for a bargain price. How does one
value the tax benefits of loss carryovers? Presumably, any such valua-
tion should take into account a discount factor depending upon the time
the losses - will not necessarily carry the day. In Collins, the indicated profit was about
$108,000 and the possible tax benefit from losses between $120,000 and $216,000.
24. In a control acquisition, in which less than all the stock is acquired, only that portion of
the basis of all the corporate properties which is attributable to the stock acquired is taken
into account in determining applicability of the presumption. This can create troublesome
problems if the corporation has outstanding stock of different classes with different rights.
25. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 228 (1954); Reg. § 1.269-5 (1962).
26. Kirkpatrick, Section 269 of the 1954 Code - Its Present and Prospective Function in
the Commissioner's Arsenal, 15 TAX L. REV. 137, 141-45 (1960); Note, Net Operating Loss
Carryovers and Corporate Adjustments: Retaining an Advantageous Tax History under Libson
Shops and Sections 269, 381, and 382, 69 YALE L J. 1201, 1237-38 (1960); Note, Tax Mo-
tivated Acquisitions; I.R.C. Section 269 and the Presumption of Subsection (c), 55 Nw. U.L
REV. 755, 766-70 (1961).
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or times when the carryovers can be utilized, the rates of tax otherwise
applicable to income offset by the carryovers, and the real possibility that
profits may not be available against which to offset them. Having valued
the tax benefits, when is the consideration paid substantially less than
their value, plus the adjusted basis of the property? Presumably, some
small differential would not give rise to the presumption, but the prob-
lem of determining substantiality is frequently far from simple.2"
Since certain types of control acquisitions do not involve payment of
any consideration, the presumption will not operate in all cases other-
wise subject to section 269. A simple example is the acquisition of con-
trol by a minority shareholder as a result of the redemption by the cor-
poration of the shares of one or more other shareholders.28
Speculation on these questions may well be largely an exercise in in-
tellectual curiosity, since the presumption in section 269(c) seems to add
little, if anything, to the presumption of correctness which always ac-
companies a determination by the Commissioner." Both, of course, are
rebuttable by appropriate evidence. The Regulations state that section
269 (c) is designed to give further weight to this normal presumption,"
but it is questionable whether it will in fact do much more than to en-
courage examining agents to propose the application of section 269 to
otherwise doubtful cases. In the one decision to date which has given
any real consideration to the subsection (c) presumption, the court held
that it had been rebutted by the same type of evidence which would
seem necessary to rebut the normal presumption in favor of the Commis-
sioner.81
REGULATIONS UNDER SECTION 269
Although section 269 was enacted in 1954, the Regulations under
it were only recently adopted. 2 Generally speaking, they reflect develop-
ments of case law, most of which have been discussed above. The Regu-
lations contain illustrations and examples of acquisitions for the purpose
of obtaining the benefit of loss carryovers of the type which one would
expect. They also point out that control or property acquisitions designed
27. See, e.g., cases under CODE § 341 (relating to collapsible corporations) or CODE §
368(a) (1) (C) (relating to reorganization transfers of substantially all the assets of a cor-
poration).
28. Other examples might be a partial liquidation involving a distribution which is not pro
rata to all shareholders, a divisive reorganization, or a recapitalization converting voting shares
into non-voting preferred.
29. Furthermore, because of its strange and probably unintended results the repeal of subsec-
tion (c) has been proposed. Report of Committee on Corporate Stockholder Relationships,
Tax Section, American Bar Ass'n (1962).
30. Reg. § 1.269-5 (1962).
31. Baton Rouge Supply Co. Inc., 36 T.C. 1 (1961), acq., 1961-2 CuM. BULL. 4.
32. T.D. 6595, 1962 INT. REV. BULL. No. 19, at 10.
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to produce future benefits by creating or utilizing tax reducing losses are
within the operation of the section. 3  Finally, the Regulations make it
clear that the Internal Revenue Service intends to apply section 269 in
appropriate cases independently of other provisions of the Code, such as
section 382, which also prohibit loss carryovers in whole or in part under
specified circumstances.' If the acquisition is accomplished in a manner
that avoids the application of section 382, or that requires a partial disal-
lowance under section 382, section 269 may nevertheless require the dis-
allowance of all or the remaining portion of the loss carryovers.
CONSEQUENCES OF SECTION 269 APPLICATION
Once section* 269 is found applicable to an acquisition, the benefits of
the losses which motivated the acquisitions will be disallowed. In the
first place, this dearly means that operating loss carryovers from taxable
years prior to the acquisition year, and net operating losses incurred in the
acquisition year prior to the acquisition, will not be deductible.
Until two cases decided in 1962, it was far from dear whether section
269 also applied to disallow post-acquisition operating losses.85 The first
of these decisions, Collins & Co. v. United States,36 involved the aquisi-
tion in March, 1954, by the Collins company of control .(about sixty-
seven per cent) of a company (Priscilla) with prior losses. On May 21,
1954, it acquired the balance of the stock in Priscilla and at about the
same time decided to liquidate Priscilla. On July 29, 1954; the. assets of
Priscilla were sold at a substantial loss, and it commenced engaging in a
different business which it operated at a profit until finally liquidated in
1957. From March to July, Priscilla had continued to/incur operating
losses.
In a consolidated return for its fiscal year ended .August 3 1? 1954, the
Collins company offset against its income the operating losses of Priscilla
incurred after May 21, 1954, and the loss from the disposition of its prop-
erties in July. In a consolidated return for the following fiscal year, in-
come of Priscilla (then operating a different business profitably) was
offset by the carryover of (1) its operating losses prior to March, 1954,
(2) its operating losses for the period from March, 1954, to May 21,
1954, and (3) the unused portion of the losses claimed in the prior year's
33. Reg. §§ 1.269-3(b) (3), 1.269-3(c) (1) (1962).
34. Reg. § 1.269-6 (1962).
35. The court did apply the section to post-acquisition losses in Elko Realty Co., 29 T.C.
1012 (1958), a1'd per curiam, 260 F.2d 949 (3d Cir. 1958), but that case has been seriously
criticized as being an unwarranted extension of § 269. Kirkpatrick, Section 269 of the
1954 Code - Its Present and Prospective Function in the Commissioner's Arsenal, 15 TAx L.
REV. 136, 151-55 (1960).
36. 193 F. Supp. 602 (D. Mass. 1961), aff'd, 303 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1962). See note 23
supra.
19631
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
consolidated return. The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the
district court, with one dissent, holding that the Collins company could
not use in its consolidated returns any of the Priscilla net operating losses,
losses on property dispositions, or loss carryovers. The finding of the
district court was that the principal purpose of the acquisition was to ob-
tain tax benefits from the past and prospective losses of Priscilla. On
appeal, the taxpayer argued that, whatever its "overall" purpose might
have been, it certainly could not have proposed to acquire Priscilla's net
operating losses incurred after May, 1954, as no one could have a pri-
mary purpose of losing a dollar to save fifty-two cents in taxes. Despite
the logic of this argument, the court of appeals rejected it, stating:
We find this argument unpersuasive because, on the facts of this case,
it unrealistically attempts to segregate into isolated segments a course of
conduct which is essentially unitary both in conception and in impact.
Assuming, as taxpayer would have us do, that the court could conclude
that the 'overall! purpose of the acquisition was to avoid taxes, viz., to
obtain the capital losses resulting from the sale of the plant and equip-
ment, then we believe that it must have been within the fair contem-
plation of the taxpayer that certain operating losses would necessarily
be incurred before this ultimate purpose could be effectuated and, to that
extent, the operating losses would be included as a necessary incident
of the 'overall purpose.' In effect once it is conceded that Priscilla was
acquired with a view towards obtaining the tax advantages stemming
from a corporate dismemberment, then we believe that all the losses
which immediately precede this ultimate act are constituent elements of
a course of conduct proscribed by Section 129. They are tarred by
the same brush.3 7
The second case, Zanesville Inv. Co. & Affiliates," concerned the
activities of Mr. Jones, the owner of all the stock of Zanesville which,
in turn, owned most of the stock of Enterprises, a profitable newspaper
publishing company. Jones also owned substantially all the stock of
Muskingum, a coal mining company, which had been operating at a
loss for a number of years with expectations of further losses.
On September 1, 1955, Jones transferred the Muskingum stock to
Zanesville which filed a consolidated return with its two subsidiaries for
1955, offsetting Muskingum's operating losses from September 1st to
December 31st against the profits of Enterprises. By July, 1956,
Jones decided to abandon the coal mining business, and sold the mining
properties of Muskingum at a substantial loss after it had also incurred
further operating losses in the period from January 1st to July, 1956.
Both these operating losses and the loss on its sale of properties were off-
set in a consolidated return for 1956 against the profits of Enterprises.
The Tax Court found that the principal purpose of the acquisition of
control of Muskingum by Zanesville was to offset its losses against the
37. 303 F.2d 142, 146 (1st Cir. 1962).
38. 38 T.C. No. 44 (June 25, 1962).
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income of Enterprises and thus secure a benefit not otherwise available.
It rejected the argument that section 269 did not apply to a consolidation
in this manner of two commonly controlled corporations. It further held
that, although the purpose of the acquisition was to offset post-acquisition
operating losses of Muskingum against the profits of Enterprises, and al-
though at the time of the acquisition there was no decision to liquidate
Muskingum, section 269 applied to all tax loss benefits which flowed
from the acquisition and therefore required disallowance of the property
disposal losses as welL
The lesson to be learned from these two decisions is that, when a tax
motivated acquisition occurs, not only will the losses which motivated the
acquisition be disallowed, but other post-acquisition operating or property
disposal losses, which perhaps formed no part of the motivation, will
probably also be disallowed.
Subsection (b) of section 269 gives the Commissioner the power to
allow a portion of the losses or to distribute or apportion income and
losses among the corporations and properties to the extent that he de-
termines will not result in the avoidance of tax. It does not appear in
any reported case that the Commissioner has ever exercised this power.
In Thomas E. Snyder Sons Co. v. Commissioner 9 the court was asked
to find that the Commissioner had abused his discretion in failing to al-
low loss carryovers in part, but it refused to do so. The taxpayer argued
that he had owned a substantial portion of stock of the loss company from
the time of its incorporation and that, although he had subsequently ac-
quired the balance of the stock (and hence control) in a tax motivated
transaction, nevertheless a portion of the loss carryovers attributable to
his original stock ownership should be allowed. Despite the fact that his
original stock had unquestionably been acquired without any evil tax
motive and the fact that, as a shareholder from the beginning, he had
suffered the economic loss attributable to this holding, the court denied
any relief. From this it appears that a partial allowance of tax benefits
in a section 269 acquisition must be obtained, if at all, from the Com-
missioner not the courts.
TREND oF SEcTIoN 269
The Commissioner in the past seven years has had greatly increased
success in obtaining court decisions supporting his disallowance of losses
and other benefits under section 269. About twenty court decisions in
that period have supported the Commissioner and only three decisions
have been favorable to the taxpayer.
The growing tendency of the courts to analyze closely the circum-
stances of an acquisition and the business purposes advanced by the tax-
39. 288 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1961).
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payer, to weigh these in the balance against the tax benefits of the losses,
and to bear heavily on a taxpayer seeking to upset the Commissioner is
dramatically illustrated by the very recent Tax Court decision in J. T.
Slocomb Co.4"
The taxpayer in Slocomb presented considerable evidence of business
purpose for the acquisition in the form of diversification into a related
business, acquisition of a loss company which nevertheless had a good.
reputation and name in the industry, and assets acquired in the loss com-
pany with a value considerably in excess of the purchase price. These
factors together added up to a respectable showing that the taxpayer had
made a good business deal irrespective of any loss carryovers. The Tax
Court, however, took careful note of the amount of loss carryovers (over
$300,000) and found that the taxpayer had not introduced sufficient evi-
dence to overcome the presumptive correctness of the Commissioner's de-
termination that the principal purpose was to avoid tax by using the carry-
overs.
Further evidence of the Tax Court's increasing support of the Com-
missioner was its willingness in Temple Square Mfg. Co.41 to apply the
"step transaction" doctrine to the area of section 269. In this case, the
loss company acquired a profitable business before the acquisition of con-
trol, but the Tax Court held the two steps to be all part of one plan and
consequently disallowed carryovers under section 269.
Despite the recent successes of the Commissioner, room still remains
for planning with a view to avoiding the application of section 269.
Zanesville Inv. Co,4 is a prime example of a situation where section
269 might have been avoided. The loss and profit companies in that
case were under common control, and there was no attempt to use loss
carryovers from periods prior to their combination. If Jones had been
well advised he might have liquidated Enterprises, the profitable corpora-
tion, into its parent, Zanesville, in a tax-free liquidation. This being an
acquisition of property from an already controlled corporation, section
269 would not apply. Following this, Jones might have merged Mus-
kingum, the loss company, into Zanesville which now owned the profit-
able newspaper publishing business, Zanesville thus acquiring again prop-
erties from a corporation controlled by its stockholders. Subsequent
operating and property disposal losses of Muskingum could have been
applied against profits of the publishing business without fear of section
269.43
40. 38 T.C. No. 75 (Aug. 29, 1962).
41. 36 T.C. 88 (1961).
42. 38 T.C. No. 44 (June 25, 1962). See discussion of this case at 300, supra.
43. Whether this course of action would also preserve the loss deductions from disallowance
under the Libson Shops rule is as yet unresolved. See Pomeroy, Limitations Where Same Tax-
payer Seeks to Carry Loss to Another Year, at 258, supra.
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